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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE i »' Lrr \h 
RICHARD FITZWATER, 
vj a intiff-Appellant- , 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT O1' TJ[[, ^lATUPf O1 TIF CASK 
The appellant, Richard Fitzv/ater, appeals from 
an order grantina respondent's notion to dismiss entered 
in the 'iniu! uuJici.il Dioti id Loui , „ ill Lul o Counts 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent's motion to dismiss the appellant!s 
petition for writ oi habeas corpus was granted by the 
lower court after a h Oc3 r i ng. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O^ \PPEAL 
Respondent see^s an order oi this Court affirming 
the decision of the trial court dismissing appellant's petition 
for wriL oi habeas corpus. 
f\ise No. 
14569 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent substantially agrees with appellant's 
Statement of Facts but makes the following additions, 
deletions and corrections: 
1. Appellant did not pursue an appeal fron the 
original conviction of possession of a stolen automobile 
as a result of an appeal bargain with the prosecution* 
The conditions of the bargin were that appellant would 
not appeal his conviction if the prosecution would dis-
miss a burglary charge pending against appellant (Tr,22-23). 
The burglary charge was dismissed. Appellant's present 
appea] stems from the assistance of counsel during 
the trial on the original conviction. 
2. There is a conflict in the testimony as 
to whether appellant's trial counsel even knew of the 
requested witness. Counsel testified that he did not 
recall either the appellant approaching him prior to 
trial and asking that he locate the witness, the 
name of the witness, or that appellant asked why the 
witness was not available at trial (Tr.24). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT RECEIVED ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF 
CD:iPETS.VT C '"ATDEL BECAUSE HIS ATTORNEY WAS A C O N T E N T 
MEMBER OF THE BAR WHO SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO IDENTIFY 
HIMSELF WITH AND REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF APPELLANT IN 
GOOD FAITH. 
-2-
The right to effective or adequate assistance 
of counsel was first enunicated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama, 237 U.S. 45 72, 
L.Ed'. 158f 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932), which held that failure . 
to make an effective appointment of counsel violates the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is a denial of 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Later cases have held that adequate assistance 
of counsel depends on whether the attorney acted within 
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 
cases. McMajin v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 7r>9, 90 S.Ct. 
144] , 25 L.Eel. 2d 7 6 3 (1970) ; Tollett v. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 i ..Ed.2d 2V1 (^12), Beyond 
the general tests hinted in Tollett and McMann, how-
ever , the Supreme Com t has relegated to f.tate and • 
lower courts the task of defining more specifically 
the standard of adequate representation by counsel. 
j n strong v. Turner , th:i s Cour t out] i ned 
the test of competence of court appointed counsel in pre-
trial proceedings with respect to a guilty plea as 
follows: 
"No one will question that the 
right of an accused to counsel means 
by a competent member of the Bar who 
shows a willingness to identify 
himself with and represent the interests 
of the defendant in good faith." 
452 P.2d at 324. 
3-
The court held that the mere fact that counsel held 
relatively brief conferences with the accused prior to 
entry of the guilty plea did not establish that the 
accused was denied effective representation by counsel. 
Other Utah cases also suggest that the Court look to 
the record for suggestions of "bad faith conduct on the 
part of the attorney." Washington v. Turner, 17 Utah 
2d 361, 412 P.2d 449 (1966); Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 
Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 (1970). This concept of 
"bad faith" was defined in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 
2d 118, 121, 449 P.2d 241, 243 (1969), as follows: 
"The [due process] requirement 
[of counsel] is not satisfied by a 
sham or pretense of an appearance in 
the record by an attorney who 
manifests no real concern about the 
interests of the accused." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In addition to the "good faith" and "sham 
or pretense" tests above, this Court in State v. 
Farnsworth, 13 Utah 2d 103, 368 P.2d 914 (1962), stated: , 
"The privilege of an accused 
to the assistance of counsel is a 
fundamental right which means a 
right to a reputable member of the 
bar who is willing and in a position 
to honestly and conscientiously 
represent his interests." 
Although appellant concedes that the above 
stringent standard exists in Utah, respondent deems 
it important to point out that the failure of 
-4-
appellant's trial counsel to call o le of appellants 
requested witnesses does not render appellant's represen-
tation inadequate. It should be noted that appellant's 
trial counsel testified that he could not recall any 
request by appellant to subpoena the missing witness. 
Counsel stated that he could P I remember wh'fhLr 
appellant approached him prior to trial about the 
witness, the name of the witness, or whether appellant 
asked why the witness was pot avaxi ifale at trial 
(Tr.24). From the record it is certainly unclear to 
what extent appellant made his request, if ho made o 10 
at all. Respondent contends that the decision of 
whether or not to call a witness to the stand is a 
matter of trial tactics left within the discretion of 
defense counsel. In Heinlin v. Smith, 54 2 P.2d 1081 
(Utah 1975), this Court, after noting the above standard, 
held that trial counsel's failure la make a motion for 
suppression, present a defense, request an instruction 
and apprise defendant of his right to an appeal did 
not amount to incompetence of counsel. 
Other cases have held that failure to cal] 
a requested witness was not error by defense counsel. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, which also follows the 
3h3f° QT" rroc} er^ ox" juscice teot, held, in Scdte v. 
Farm, 112 Ariz. 132, 539 P.2d 889 (197ri)f that defense 
-5-
counsel's decision not to call the defendant and other 
witnesses to the stand was not evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel* The Court of Appeals of In-
diana, also following the sham or mockery of justice 
standard, has also held in at least two recent cases 
that the failure of defense counsel to interview and 
obtain the presence of witnesses at trial was not 
error "unless the testimony in question would likely 
produce a different result were a new trial held." 
Greentree v» State, 339 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. App. 1975); 
Harrison v. State, 337 N.E.2d 533 (Ind, App. 1975). 
See also United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d (10th 
Cir. 1975) . 
For these reasons respondent contends that 
the failure of defense counsel to call one of the 
witnesses requested by appellant did not constitute 
such bad faith conduct or make such a sham of the trial 
proceedings that appellant was denied effective counsel* 
POINT II 
REGARDLESS OF THE STANDARD ADOPTED BY THIS 
COURT APPELLANT RECEIVED ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF 
COMPETENT COUNSEL BECAUSE HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY ACTED WITHIN 
THE RANGE OF COMPETENCE DEMANDED OF ATTORNEYS IN 
CRIMINAL CASES. 
-6-
Although appellant is aware that respondent's 
argument under Point I is dispositive of the facts 
and conclusions in the present case, appellant main-
tains that the current standards for evaluating effective 
representation by lawyers should be changed. In this 
regard respondent recognizes that it has the duty 
not only to represent the State of Utah in this 
specific case, but also to promote fair and equitable 
1 ega 1 :- ,:<. 1 a rc *' r<-% r "a !:•'••'^  =*:eJ r::e -J. In con j unction wi th 
this latter duty, respondent has found it appropriate 
to examine the law in this area and present the court 
w:i th sufficient material upon which to base its 
considered opinion. 
Of the 51 state jurisdictions, 49 have • 
made fairly recent pronouncements concerning the 
current tests for evaluating defense attorney per-
formance in criminal matters .—' T\ zenty states , 
including Utah, follow the traditional "sham or 
— I t appears neither South Dakota nor Louisiana 
have made recent decisions on this question. 
- 7-
mockery of justice" standard.— This test has 
sometimes been called the "farce" or "shock the 
conscience" test. In essence, courts using this 
test state that in order for an appellant to success-
fully claim that he received ineffective counsel 
in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights to counsel 
and a fair trial, counsel's representation must be 
so inadequate that the trial amounted to a sham, 
farce, or mockery of justice, or shocked the conscience 
of the court. 
It appears that thirteen (13) states have 
specifically rejected the "sham or mockery of justice" 
-'Johnson v. State, 329 So.2d 160 (Ala.Cr.App. 
1976); State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 208, 540 P.2d 680 (1975); 
McDonald v. State, 520 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1975); People v. 
Steger, 128 Cal.Rptr.161, 546 P.2d 665 (1976) ; State v. 
Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 356 A.2d 147 (1974); Thompson v. U.S., 
307 A.2d 764 (D.C.App. 1973); Parker v. State, 295 So.2d 
313 (Fla.App. 1974); Howard v. State, 348 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. 
1976); Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky.App. 
1974); Poitraw v. State, 246 A.2d 815 (Me. 1968); State v. 
O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 216 N.W.2d 822 (1974); Parham v. 
State, 299 So.2d 582 (Miss. 1969); State v. McElveen, 544 
P.2d 820 (Mont. 1975); Sullivan v. Warden Nevada State Prison, 
540 P.2d 112 (Nev. 1975); State v. Trivitt, 89 N.M. 162, 548 
P.2d 442 (1976); State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 
174 (1976); Glazier v. State, 548 P.2d 668 (Okla.Crim.App. 
1976); McCall v. State, 257 S.C. 93, 184 S.E.2d 341 (1971); 
Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969); Slayton 
v. Weinburger, 213 Va. 690, 194 S.E.2d 703 (1973). 
test in favor of a more lieberal standard.— The 
remaining sixteen (16) jurisdictions also use a test 
other than the sham or mockery of justice test but 
4/ 
have apparently not specifically rejected it.— 
This occurred in some cases because courts found 
the tests compatible and in other cases because the 
traditional test had apparently never been or was 
infrequently used. 
Among the federal circuit courts it appears 
that six circuits continue to apply a "sham or 
mockery" test while five circuits have specifically 
rejected it. 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 228, (1976), "Modern 
Status of Rule as to Test in Federal Court of Effective 
Representation by Counsel." 
-'Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1974); 
People v. Gonzales, 543 P.2d 72 (Colo.App. 1975); Harris 
v. State, 293 A.2d 291 (Del. 1972); State v. Tucker, 
97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975); State v. Mahoney, 16 Md.App. 
;93, 294 A.2d 471 (1972); People v. Lewis, 64 Mich. App. 175, 
235 N.W.2d 100 (1975); State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 222 
N.W.2d 573 (1974); Rook v. Cupp, 526 P.2d 605 (Ore.App. 1974); 
Garrett v. State, 530 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1975); Ex Parte 
Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); In Re Cronin, 336 
A.2d 164 (Vt. 1975); State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W.Va. . 
1974); State v. Harper, 57 Wise.2d 543 205 N.W. 2d 1 (1973). 
4/Dobbs v. State, 235 Ga. 800, 221 S.E.2d 576 (1976); 
State v. Kahalewai, 54 Ha. 28, 501 P.2d 977 (1972); People v. Grant 
347 N.E.2d 244 (111.App. 1976); State v. Dee, 218 N.W.2d 5-61 (Iowa 
1974); Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan. 377, 543 P.2d 881 (1975); Dell 
Chiaie v. Commonwealth, 327 N.E. 2d 696 (Mass. 1975); Knight v. 
State, 491 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. 1973); State v. McCarthy, 112 N.H. 437, 
::93 A.2d 7-VJ (1972J; State v. Hines, 109 N.J. Super 298, 263 A.2d 
161 (1970), cert, den. 400 U.S. 867; People v. LaBree, 357 N.Y.S.2d 
412, 34 N.Y.2d 257, 313 N.E.2d 730 (1974); State v. McKay, 234 N.W. 
853 (N.D.1975); State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 341 N.E.2d 304 
(1976); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 350 A.2d 847 (Pa. 1976); State v. 
Turley, 113 R.I. 104, 318 A.2d 445 (1974); State v. Myers, 86 Wash. 
2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976); Galbraith v. State, 503 P.2d 1192 
(Wyo. 1972). 
-9-
The above discrepency between jurisdictions as 
to the applicable standard is not unusual in light of 
fact that the United States Supreme Court has made 
only general guidelines in the area and left the 
specifics to the state and lower federal courts. De-
spite those cases cited by appellant supporting re-
jection of the "sham or mockery" test, there are 
some state courts which have specifically decided to 
follow the traditional rule. In McDonald v. State, 
520 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1975), where appellant asked 
the court to change the traditional test, the court 
stated: 
"There are two answers to the 
appellant's contention. First, 
not all of the federal courts 
have abandoned the fmockery of 
justice1 standard. For example, 
in a recent case, United States 
v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737 (1974), the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit explained that the mockery 
of justice standard fis not meant 
to be an impenetrable obstacle 
to any meaningful analysis of the 
facts of the particular case.' 
The court then quoted with approval 
this language from its earlier 
opinion in McQueen v. Swenson, 
8 Cir., 498 F.2d 207 (1974): 
'Stringent as the 'mockery 
of justice' standard may seem, we 
have nevec intended it to be used 
as a shibboleth to avoid a searching 
-10-
evaluation of possible con-
stitutional violations; nor has 
it been so used in this circuit. 
It was not intended that the 
inockery of justice1 standard be 
taken literally, but rather that 
it be employed as an embodiment 
of the principle that a petitioner 
must shoulder a heavy burden in 
proving unfairness.f" 
In State v. Trivitt, 89 N.M. 162, 548 P.2d 442 (1976) 
the court stated: 
"While other jurisdictions 
have seen fit to change standards 
on this subject, we in New Mexico 
are not so disposed. It is rel-
atively easy for different counsel 
on an appealed case to differ on trial 
tactics used during the trial of a 
cause. Hindsight is not always 
better than foresight in the course 
of litigation from beginning to 
end. We see no showing whatsoever 
that trial counsel did not use a 
n^ormal and customary degree of skill1 
under the circumstances of this case. 
The trial in our opinion did not 
result in a fsham, farce, or mockery 
of justice.f" 
Even if this Court were to reject the current 
"sham or mockery" test, two questions would remain: 
first, what standard should be adopted, and second, did 
counsel's failure to call the witness in the present 
case constitute ineffective counsel. The first 
Question would be answered probably by formulating a 
rule similar to those in other jurisdictions which have 
rejected the "sham or mockery" test. These rules are 
listed in the cases in the various footnotes to this brief. 
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Whatever this Court concludes with respect 
to the applicable standard, it is respondent's con-
tention, in answer to the second question, that appellant's 
claim nevertheless lacks merit. In dozens of federal 
circuit court cases, the courts have rejected the 
contention that failure to call a witness was in-
effective counsel even under the so-called "modern" 
or "reasonableness" tests. See 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 
272-274 (1976). State courts have also held similarly. 
In People v. Anaya, 545 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Colo. App. 
1975), where the appellant claimed ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failure to seek a continuance to insure 
the presence of a defense witness, the court stated: 
"Errors of judgment and trial 
strategy have been held not to 
amount to an infringement of the 
constitutional right to effective 
counsel. . . Furthermore, there is 
no violation of such rights if 
the attorney refuses to call a 
witness as requested by the defendant." 
Jn State v. Hess, 86 Wash. 2d 51, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975), 
the Washington Supreme Court held that the failure of 
defendant's court-appointed trial counsel to subpoena 
a witness was a matter of legitimate trial tactics 
and not a denial of defendant's right to effective 
counsel. See also People v. Hines, 34 111.App.3d 
97, 339 N.E.2d 489 (1975); People v. Stevenson, 60 
Mich.App. 614, 231 N.W. 2d 476 (1975). 
-12-
Whatever test is adopted by this Court, it is 
clear that appellant's claim cannot stand because his 
trial counsel was sufficiently adequate and effectree 
to fullfill appellant's constitutional rights. For 
this reason respondent requests this Court to sustain 
the judgment and order of the district court denying 
appellantfs petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM PETITIONING 
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUNDS OF IN-
ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION BECAUSE HE BARGAINED AWAY 
THIS KNOWN RIGHT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN 
A TIMELY APPEAL. 
Appellant's argument that he received in-
adequate assistance of counsel was an allegation 
known to him at the time of his commitment to the 
Utah State Prison, yet appellant bargained away his 
right to appeal in exchange for dismissal of a burglary 
charge. Appellant cannot now use the writ of habeas 
corpus as a belated means of appellate review. In 
Pearson v. Turner, No. 1274 9, unpublished opinion of 
the Utah Supreme Court, September 18, 1972, appellant 
also filed a writ of habeas corpus in breach of his 
agreement to dismiss an appeal. In holding that the 
district court correctly denied appellant's writ of 
habeas corpus, this Court stated: 
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"The instant petition is, in 
effect, a guise to pursue the appeal 
he voluntarily dismissed, since he 
asserts that there was insufficient 
evidence for the trial court to 
have submitted the charge of either 
burglary or grand larceny to the 
jury or to support the convictions 
therefor. Plaintiff urges such 
error constituted a denial of due 
process of law and therefore contends 
that habeas corpus is an appropriate 
remedy in his particular case. Habeas 
corpus is not a substitute for 
appellate review. After an accused 
has been convicted of a crime, any 
claimed error or defect is required 
to be corrected by appeal within the 
time provided by law; otherwise, the 
judgment is final. Such a judgment 
is subject to a collateral attack 
by an extraordinary writ only where 
there exists no jurisdiction or 
authority over the one restrained, 
or where the requirements of the 
law have been so ignored or distorted 
that the party has been substantially 
denied due process of law, or where 
some other circumstance exists that 
it would be wholly unconscionable 
not to re-examine the conviction." 
See also Hines v. Baker, 422 F.2d 1002 (10th Cir. 1970), 
wherein petitioner argued that he had made no intelligent 
and knowing waiver of his right to appeal. In that 
case, he had been convicted of first degree murder and 
had received a sentence of life imprisonment. He and 
his attorney agreed no appeal should be taken due to 
concern over the possibility of a deatii sentence if 
a reversal and new trial were obtained. The Tenth 
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Circuit Court ruled that if a petitioner decided 
to forego his appeal after discussion with counsel to 
escape the possibility of other punishment (as is the 
situation in the present case) there is no "con-
stitutional infringement11 in denying the writ. 
When the same facts alleged in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus are known to the petitioner 
at the time of his judgment, his proper remedy is 
not a writ. In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 
P.2d 968 (1968), the petitioner contended that he was 
denied the right to counsel, and that he did not 
understand the consequences of his guilty plea. The 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the petitioner was 
not entitled to the habeas corpus remedy: 
"If the contention of error is 
something which is known or should be 
known to the party at the time the 
judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the 
time permitted by regular proscribed 
procedure, or the judgment becomes 
final and is not subject to further 
attack, except in some such unusual 
circumstance as we have mentioned 
above. Were it otherwise, the regular 
rules of procedure governing appeals 
and limitations of time specified 
therein would be rendered impotent." 
Id. at 98-99, 969. 
See also Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 
343 (1970); Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 
P.2d 34 (1972); A: ,erson v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 
493 P.2d 1278 (1972) . 
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For these reasons, the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus is an improper remedy and the 
district court's order denying the petition should be 
granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Because appellant's claim of ineffective 
counsel cannot be granted under present law, and even 
if a new standard is adopted should still not be 
granted, and because he has violated the terms of 
his earlier appeal bargain by appealing an issue he 
knew of and bargained away, respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to sustain the judgment and 
order of the District Court denying appellant's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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